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Abstract
The issue of timing is addressed in a game between managerial ¯rms. The choice
over timing can be taken either by managers or by entrepreneurs. It is shown
that (i) delegation drastically modi¯es the owners' preferences concerning the
distribution of roles, as compared to the setting where ¯rms act as pure pro¯t-
maximizers; and (ii) the ability of moving ¯rst in the market game entails that,
at least observationally, the owner of the leading ¯rm prefers not to delegate. I
show that the choice of the timing by managers entails the same pro¯t owners
would achieve by specifying the timing in the delegation contract.
J.E.L. Classi¯cation Numbers: D43, L13
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1 Introduction
The earliest literature in oligopoly theory treated the choice between simultaneous
and sequential moves as exogenous (Stackelberg, 1934; Fellner, 1949). Later
contributions investigated the preferences of pro¯t-maximizing ¯rms over the
distribution of roles (Gal-Or, 1985; Dowrick, 1986; Boyer and Moreaux, 1987a,b).
The preference for leadership (respectively, followership) in quantity (price) games
can be established on the basis of the slope of ¯rms' reaction functions or, likewise,
resorting to the concepts of strategic substitutability or complementarity between
products (Bulow et al., 1985).1
Recent literature explicitly models the strategic choice of timing. Hamilton
and Slutsky (1990) endogenize the choice of roles in noncooperative two-person
games, by analyzing an extended game where players (say, ¯rms) are required
to set both the actual moves or actions and the time at which such actions
are to be implemented. When ¯rms choose to act at di®erent times, sequential
equilibria obtain, while if they decide to move at the same time, simultaneous
Nash equilibria are observed. The choice of timing occurs in a preplay stage which
does not take place in real time, so that there is no discounting associated with
waiting. Matsumura (1995) analyses endogenous timing in a two-stage strategic
commitment game where the decision upon a cost-reducing investment is followed
by Cournot competition at the market stage (as in Brander and Spencer, 1983).
Matsumura shows that the extended game has a unique equilibrium involving
both ¯rms setting output levels at the earliest occasion. Another application of
HS's box of tools is in Lambertini (1996), where a market is considered where
at least one ¯rm is labor-managed (LM). It is shown that, when an LM ¯rm
competes against a pro¯t-maximizing counterpart in a Cournot fashion, the pro¯t
seeker takes the lead.
As to the interplay between market competition and the internal organization
of the ¯rm, several contributions show that, in order to acquire the Stackelberg
leader's position in the product market, ¯rms' stockholders delegate the control
over their assets to managers who end up maximizing an objective function con-
sisting in a weighted sum of pro¯ts and sales (Vickers, 1985; Fershtman and Judd,
1987; Sklivas, 1987; Fershtman et al., 1991; Polo and Tedeschi, 1992; Barcena-
Ruiz and Paz Espinoza, 1996). In a Cournot setting, the equilibrium indeed
involves all ¯rms delegating control in order to try and achieve a dominant po-
sition. Each ¯rm would prefer the rivals not to delegate, the equilibrium being
a®ected by a prisoner's dilemma. Basu (1995) extends the basic model to explic-
itly describe the owner's decision to hire a manager in a Cournot duopoly.2 He
shows that a Stackelberg equilibrium may arise, with just one ¯rm delegating,
1On the role of cost asymmetry, see Ono (1982).
2Another incentive to hire managers not necessarily aligned with the owners' objectives may
derive from the owners' attempt at colluding (Lambertini and Trombetta, 1997).
1
even though the cost of hiring an agent is the same across owners. However,
no attention has been devoted so far to the question whether the endogenous
choice of roles by managerial ¯rms may actually lead to situations where these
¯rms move sequentially in the market game. Moreover, a question mark arises
as to whether the separation between ownership and control may a®ect owners'
preferences over the distribution of roles in price or quantity games.3
These issues are tackled here in a model where ¯rms supply substitute goods
(Singh and Vives, 1984). I assume that principals delegate to agents the price
or output decisions and instruct them to move early or delay as long as pos-
sible, on the basis of the pro¯t ranking associated with the mutually exclusive
roles of Stackelberg leader, Stackelberg follower or Nash competitor. First, the
managerial preferences over timing are analysed. I show that they coincide with
the preferences characterizing pure pro¯t-maximizing agents. This is due to the
fact that delegation is observationally equivalent to a parallel shift of the demand
function which does not a®ect the sequence of payo®s arising under simultane-
ous and sequential play. When the owners' preferences over the distribution of
roles are examined, two main results emerge. Under Cournot competition, the
Nash equilibrium breaks as usual the sequence of the payo®s associated with the
Stackelberg equilibrium, though the latter are reversed as compared to the set-
ting where no delegation takes place. The leader cannot do any better than she is
already doing, in that delegation does not add anything to the position acquired
by moving ¯rst, given that the two decision are observationally equivalent. On
the other hand, the follower can pro¯tably shift outwards her reaction function
by hiring a manager. This entails that delegation becomes a free-riding device
allowing the follower to produce more and gain higher pro¯ts than the leader. In
the case of Bertrand competition, from the owners' viewpoint leadership is pre-
ferred to followership, and both are better than being a Nash competitor. Thus,
once again, the payo®s emerging from sequential play are reversed as compared
to the usual sequence, while still being both higher than the pro¯t associated
with simultaneous play.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
basic setting. Section 3 deals with the game of timing between managers. The
owners' preferences are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
I adopt a simpli¯ed version of the linear duopoly model introduced by Dixit (1979)
and then used by Singh and Vives (1984) and many others. Two symmetric ¯rms
compete on a market for di®erentiated products, supplying one good each. The
3The picture could be enriched by considering a fully-°edged decision problem involving the
choice of internal organization of the ¯rm, timing, strategic market variable, and ¯nally the
actual competition at the market stage. This is done in Lambertini (1997).
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inverse demand function faced by ¯rm i is
pi = 1¡ qi ¡ °qj; (1)
where j 6= i denotes i's rival, and j°j · 1: When ° 2 [¡1; 0[; the two goods
are complements, while in the range where ° 2]0; 1] they are substitutes. In
the remainder of the paper, I shall con¯ne to the latter case, since once one
avails of the results pertaining to substitute goods, a simple reversion gives those
pertaining to the case of complements. From (1), the direct demand function for
¯rm i can be easily obtained:
qi =
1
1 + °
¡ 1
1¡ °2 pi +
°
1¡ °2pj: (2)
I assume ¯rms operate with the same technology, characterized by a constant
marginal production cost. Without loss of generality, I normalize it to zero.
Consequently, pro¯ts coincide with revenues,4 ¼i = piqi:
Firms can choose whether to move at the same time or scatter their respective
decisions. If they decide to move simultaneously, no matter whether early or
late, a Nash equilibrium in prices or quantities (or mixed) obtains. If, conversely,
they move sequentially, then a Stackelberg equilibrium is observed. This is what
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) de¯ne as an extended game with observable delay.5
In order to illustrate this concept, consider the simplest extended game where
¯rms can set a single strategic variable (e.g., price or quantity) and must choose
between moving ¯rst or second. I shall adopt here a symbology which largely
replicates that in HS (1990, p. 32). De¯ne ¡1 = (N;§1;-1) the extended game
with observable delay. The set of players (or ¯rms) is N = fA;Bg, and ® and
¯ are the compact and convex intervals of R1 representing the actions available
to A and B in the basic game. -1 is the payo® function. Payo®s depend on
the actions undertaken in the basic (market) game, according to the following
functions, a : ® £ ¯ ! R1 and b : ® £ ¯ ! R1. The set of times at which ¯rms
can choose to move is T = fF; Sg, i.e., ¯rst or second. The set of strategies
for player i is §1i = fF; Sg £ R1 £ ©i, where ©i is the set of functions that map
T£¯(or ®) into ®(or ¯). Let k = (n; l; f) de¯ne the role (Nash competitor, leader
and follower, respectively) that ¯rm i plays as a result of the combined choice of
timing taken by the two ¯rms. If both ¯rms choose to move at the same time, they
obtain the payo®s associated with the simultaneous Nash equilibrium, (an; bn),
otherwise they get the payo®s associated with the Stackelberg equilibrium, e.g.,
4A more general formulation of the pro¯t function would be ¼i = (A¡qi¡°qj ¡c)qi: Observe
that, as long as a constant marginal cost c is assumed, A ¡ c simply exerts a scale e®ect, so
that its normalization has no qualitative bearings on the results.
5They also consider an extended game with action commitment, where an agent can play
early only by selecting an action to which he is then committed. The undominated equilibria
of such a game always involve sequential moves. This game is close in spirit to Robson (1990).
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(al; bf ) if A moves ¯rst and B moves second, or vice versa. The game can be
described in normal form as in matrix 1 (cfr. HS, 1990, p. 33).
B
F S
A F an; bn al; bf
S af ; bl an; bn
Matrix 1
Moreover, ¯rms' stockholders may decide whether to delegate control to man-
agers who are not interested in pro¯t maximization as such, as they own no share,
but rather in sales, so that in case of managerialization ¯rm i 's maximand mod-
i¯es as follows:6
Mi = ¼i + µiqi; (3)
where parameter µi identi¯es the weight attached to the volume of sales, and is
optimally set by the stockholder in the employment contract, in order to maximize
pro¯ts (Vickers, 1985). As to µi; one might believe that it should be natural to
think of it as being positive. For reasons that will become clear in the remainder
of the paper, I assume µi 2 R . Managerial remuneration is a two-part wage,
where a component is exogenously ¯xed and the other is increasing in output
(see Fershtman and Judd, 1987; and Basu, 1995).
3 The game of timing between managers
The game where managers are delegated both the choice of the output level and
the choice of timing can be quickly dealt with. The objective function of the
managers at the market stage can be rewritten as follows:
Mi = (pi + µi)qi: (4)
This entails that delegation mimics a shift in the demand function.7 It is trivial
to verify that the payo®s M ki ; where k indicates the role, are ordered according
to the same ranking as pro¯ts would be if the game of timing where played by
entrepreneurs, without delegation, as in HS. This holds independently of the
strategic variable being ¯xed by each ¯rm, so that we have
M li (C) > M
n
i (C) > M
f
i (C); (5)
6Considering a linear contract only is restrictive, but this assumption is adopted for the sake
of comparability with most of the existing literature.
7If unit production cost were not normalized to zero, delegation could as well be interpreted
as a shift of the cost function. The two interpretations are indeed qualitatively equivalent. The
direction of such shifts depends on the sign of µ, which is discussed below.
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Mfi (B) > M
l
i (B) > M
n
i (B); (6)
where the letter in parenthesis indicates whether ¯rms are Cournot or Bertrand
agents. As a result, managerial preferences concerning the distribution of roles
are l(C) Â n(C) Â f(C) and f(B) Â l(B) Â n(B): The outcome can be summa-
rized as follows. When managers are being delegated both the output and the
timing decision, the extended game with observable delay has (i) a unique sub-
game perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, if both ¯rms act as quantity-setters;
(ii) a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, up to a permutation,
plus a correlated equilibrium and a mixed-strategy equilibrium, if both ¯rms act
as price-setters.8 Now the following question arises: if, say, the owner of ¯rm i
anticipates that the manager of his ¯rm will move early (or will delay, respec-
tively), then will he indeed allow any modi¯cation of the output level through
µi on the part of his manager, as compared to what would be required by strict
pro¯t maximization? This issue is tackled in the following section.
4 The stockholders' perspective
In order to answer the question raised above, consider what happens in the two
possible epiphanies of the Cournot setting. To start with, take the case in which
managers play the Cournot-Nash equilibrium due to the fact that they delay the
output decision as long as possible. The ¯rst order condition (FOC) for ¯rm i is
@Mi(C)
@qi
= 1¡ 2qi ¡ °qj + µi = 0; (7)
where (q; q) reveals that both ¯rms are quantity-setters. This yields
qni (C) =
2 + 2µi ¡ ° ¡ °µj
4¡ °2 ; (8)
when ° = 1, i.e., goods are perfect substitutes, (9) obviously coincides with
Vickers' ¯nding (see Vickers, 1985, p. 142). The pro¯t function simpli¯es as
follows:
¼i(µi; µj) =
(2¡ 2µi ¡ ° ¡ °µj + °2µi)(2 + 2µi ¡ ° ¡ °µj)
4¡ °2 : (9)
The stockholder's FOC w.r.t. µi is
@¼i(µi; µj)
@µi
=
(°2 ¡ 2)(2 + 2µi ¡ ° ¡ °µj) + 2(2¡ 2µi ¡ ° ¡ °µj + °2µi)
4¡ °2 = 0;
(10)
8It can be easily shown that the mixed case where one ¯rm is a quantity-setter, while the
other acts as a price-setter yields a unique equilibrium, with the quantity-setter leading.
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yielding
µni (C) =
°2(2¡ °)
°3 ¡ 4°2 + 8 (11)
as the optimal output weight for pro¯t maximization if simultaneous play is
expected to occur between managers ¯xing the level of production in the ensuing
market stage. Equilibrium pro¯t turns out as
¼ni (C) =
2(2¡ °2)
(°2 ¡ 2° ¡ 4)2 : (12)
Let me now turn to the Stackelberg game. By symmetry, I con¯ne to the case
where the manager of ¯rm j takes the lead, while that of ¯rm i follows. Hence,
the leader's problem consists in maximizing Mj(C) subject to the constraint
@Mi(q; q)=@qi = 0; as in (8). The leader's FOC is
@Mj(C)
@qj
= 1¡ 2qj + °2qj ¡ °
2
(1 + µi) + µj = 0; (13)
yielding
qlj(C) =
2¡ °(1 + µi) + 2µj
2(2¡ °2) (14)
as the optimal output for the leader. The pro¯t function at the ¯rst stage simplify
as follows:
¼fi =
(4¡ 2° ¡ °2 ¡ 4µi + 3°2µi ¡ 2°µj)(4¡ 2° ¡ °2 + 4µi ¡ °2µi ¡ 2°µj)
16(2¡ °2)2 ;
¼lj =
(2¡ ° ¡ °µi + 2µj)(2¡ ° ¡ °µi ¡ 2µj)
8(2¡ °2) : (15)
At this stage, stockholders simultaneously ¯x their respective µ: The FOCs are
@¼fi
@µi
=
4°2 ¡ 2°3 ¡ °4 ¡ 16µi(1¡ °2 + 3°4)¡ 2°3µj
8(2¡ °2)2 = 0; (16)
@¼lj
@µj
=
µj
°2 ¡ 2 = 0: (17)
As a consequence of (18), µlj(C) = 0; i.e., the stockholder of the ¯rm which is
going to take the lead in the ensuing market stage decides that it is optimal not
to allow for any output expansion, while
µfi (C) =
°2(4¡ 2° ¡ °2)
16¡ 16°2 + 3°4 2 [0; 1=3] as ° 2 [0; 1]: (18)
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Equilibrium pro¯ts are
¼fi (C) =
(4¡ 2° ¡ °2)2
4(16¡ 16°2 + 3°4); ¼
l
j(C) =
(2¡ °2)(8¡ 4° ¡ 4°2 + °3)2
2(16¡ 16°2 + 3°4)2 : (19)
Evaluating (13) and (20) it can be quickly established that
¼fi (C) > ¼
n
i (C) > ¼
l
i(C) 8 ° 2 [0; 1]: (20)
The inequalities in (21) reveal that the relevant payo® sequence emerging from
the quantity game where both ¯rms are managerial is reversed as compared to
the ranking observed when ¯rms strictly behave as pro¯t-seeking units. This
implies that, from the owners' viewpoint, the preferences over the distribution
of roles turn out to be reversed as well, so that the delegation contract should
contain the clause that the manager must move at the latest available occasion,
in order to avoid being the leader. This is con¯rmed by inspection of matrix
2, describing the reduced form of the extended quantity-setting game from the
owners' standpoint.
j
F S
i F ¼ni (q; q); ¼
n
j (q; q) ¼
l
i(q; q); ¼
f
j (q; q)
S ¼fi (q; q); ¼
l
j(q; q) ¼
n
i (q; q); ¼
n
j (q; q)
Matrix 2
The obligation to move late being absent, both managers' decision would be
to move ¯rst, as we already know from the previous section, with unfortunate
consequences for a principal if the manager of the rival ¯rm is indeed compelled
to move late by the terms of her hiring contract. Obviously, in equilibrium, the
pro¯t accruing to stockholders is the same as long as ¯rms move simultaneously,
but to ensure that this is indeed the equilibrium outcome, both managers have
to be obliged to behave against their own nature.
The setting where both ¯rms are price-setters can now be brie°y depicted.
The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is characterized by:
¼ni (B) =
2(1¡ °)(2¡ °2)
(1 + °)(°2 + 2° ¡ 4)2 ; µ
n
i (B) =
°2(° ¡ 1)
4¡ 2° ¡ °2 : (21)
Observe that µni (B) < 0 8° 2 [0; 1[; while it is nil in the case of perfect sub-
stitutability. Hence, price competition leads the owners to design the optimal
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delegation contract so as to generate output restriction rather than expansion.9
When, say, ¯rm j takes the lead in the market stage, the relevant equilibrium
magnitudes are
¼fi (B) =
(1¡ °)(°2 ¡ 2° ¡ 4)2
4(4¡ °2)(1 + °)(3°2 ¡ 4)2 ; µ
f
i (B) =
°2(° ¡ 1)(4 + 2° ¡ °2)
16¡ 16°2 + 3°4 ; (22)
¼lj(B) =
(1¡ °)(2¡ °2)(°3 + 4°2 ¡ 4° ¡ 8)2
2(° ¡ 2)2(2 + °)2(1 + °)(3°2 ¡ 4)2 ; µ
l
j(B) = 0: (23)
Again, notice that moving ¯rst involve, at least from the observational point of
view, no delegation; and µfi (B) < 0 8° 2]0; 1[: Pro¯ts can be ordered according
to the following ranking:
¼li(B) ¸ ¼fi (B) ¸ ¼ni (B) 8° 2 [0; 1]; (24)
so that, contrarily to what is observed under strictly pro¯t-seeking behaviour,
leading is at least weakly preferred to following. Nevertheless, obviously, the
extended game with observable delay, as seen with the owners' eyes, still has
two subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies, namely, (F;S) and (S; F ),
together with a correlated equilibrium and a mixed-strategy equilibrium. The
explanation of the reversal of fortune between leader and follower under Bertrand
competition is largely analogous to the one underlying Cournot competition. The
above ¯ndings concerning the timing game between owners can be summarized
in the following:
Proposition 1 When managers are being delegated only the market decision,
while the choice of timing remains in the stockholders' hands, the extended game
with observable delay observationally exhibits the same subgame perfect equilibria
arising if both decisions were delegated to managers.
It can be shown that the same also holds in the mixed setting where one ¯rm is
a quantity-setter while the other is a price-setter. Irrespectively of the market
variable, delegation and the ability to move ¯rst are observationally equivalent,
or, in the jargon of demand theory, perfect substitutes. This implies that these
instruments can be used only alternatively. Hence, if the owner, say, of ¯rm j,
anticipates that his manager is going to move ¯rst in the market subgame, he also
knows that there is no reason to use delegation to achieve the very same goal.
The latter consideration can be interpreted in two ways, namely, that µlj = 0
means either that the delegation contract allows for no output expansion at all,
forcing the manager to maximize pro¯t only, or that there is no delegation at
9It is usually assumed that managers have a preference for output expansion. The above
result may hold if one thinks of the population of consumers as consisting of two type of
individuals, one having a taste for output expansion, the other for output restrictions.
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all and the ¯rm is entrepreneurial. Consider now the follower's behaviour. In
the Cournot setting, if the owner of ¯rm i knows that his manager is going to
move late in the market stage, he ¯nds pro¯table to use the delegation device so
as to shift his own reaction function outwards. Delegation works thus as a free-
riding tool in the hands of the follower. Hence, both owners must oblige their
respective managers to move as late as possible, in that moving late is a strictly
dominant strategy as far as stockholders are concerned, as in Vickers (1985). In
the Bertrand setting, delegation is used by the owner of the ¯rm moving late,
to obtain an output restriction. This drives the price of the follower upwards
and the follower's pro¯t below the leader's. As long as both ¯rms obtain higher
pro¯ts under sequential than under simultaneous play, it follows that delegation
is irrelevant as far as the choice of timing is concerned.
5 Concluding remarks
The preferences over the distribution of roles when an extended duopoly game is
played by managerial ¯rms have been discussed. The main ¯ndings are that (i)
managers' and stockholders' preferences do not coincide, and yet (ii) it is wise
to leave the explicit timing decision out of the delegation contract intentionally,
given that the result of strategic interaction between managers is observationally
equivalent to the outcome that would emerge at equilibrium if the owners' pref-
erences were literally adhered to. As a ¯nal remark, consider the possibility that
¯rms choose the strategic variable for the market subgame. A straightforward
implication of the foregoing analysis is that adding a stage to model the choice
of the market variable would lead to the same conclusion reached by Singh and
Vives (1984), namely, that ¯rms choose to play a simultaneous Cournot-Nash
game since quantity-setting is a strictly dominant strategy.
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